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ARKANSAS'S ENTRY INTO THE NOT-So-NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 16, 1998, a law enforcement officer charged Kenneth A.
Sullivan with possession of methamphetamines after conducting an inven-
tory search of his Chevy Blazer following a traffic stop for speeding and
having illegally tinted windows.' On August 25, 1999, law enforcement
officers charged David Griffin with possession of methamphetamines after
police officers conducting a "knock and talk" entered and searched his
home at 10:15 p.m.2 In a challenge to a local sodomy statute, Elena Picado,
a homosexual woman, sued Little Rock prosecuting attorney Larry Jegley in
his official capacity for deprivation of her constitutional rights.3 At first
blush the above recounts may seem uneventful. The Arkansas Supreme
Court, however, heard arguments in each of these cases, and the details of
each case reveal a controversial struggle between state and federal constitu-
tional jurisprudence within the state.
In the late 1970s, scholars identified the struggle between the federal
and state constitutions as the "new judicial federalism." 4 During this era
states began to reassert their power to analyze legal issues under their own
constitutions.5 To date over one-half of the states have utilized their own
constitutions to acknowledge more individual rights than the Federal Con-
stitution provides.6
The new judicial federalism most visibly affected criminal procedure
cases. 7 Some scholars attribute the impetus for the new judicial federalism
to the ideological differences between the Warren Court and the Burger
Court.8 As the Court became more conservative in the area of criminal de-
fendants' rights, the states stepped in with their own solutions.9 The new
1. State v. Sullivan, 340 Ark. 315, 11 S.W.3d 526 (2000) ("Sullivan 1"), cert. granted,
reversed and remanded, 532 U.S. 769 (2001) (per curiam) ("Sullivan IX'), aff'd, 348 Ark.
647, 74 S.W.3d 215 (2002) ("Sullivan IV').
2. Griffin v. State, 347 Ark. 788, 796, 67 S.W.3d 582, 587 (2002).
3. Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 608, 80 S.W.3d 332, 334 (2002).
4. G. Alan Tarr, The States and Civil Liberties, in ADVISORY COMM. ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 49 (1989)
[hereinafter Tarr, States and Civil Liberties].
5. Id.
6. See infra text accompanying note 114.
7. Jennifer Friesen, Symposium: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX.
L. REV. 1269, 1270-71 (1985).
8. E.g., David A. Harris, Addressing Racial Profiling in the States, 3 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 367 (2001), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/conlaw.
9. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Con-
stitutions as Guardians ofIndividual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 537-38 (1986) [herein-
after Brennan, Bill of Rights].
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judicial federalism represents more than a decade of heightened state court
activism. 0 It represents states' reclamation of their role as guardians of in-
dividual rights."1 On another level it represents the recognition of states as
unique local governments.
Griffin, Sullivan, and Picado are examples of the Arkansas Supreme
Court's recent decision to enter the not-so-new judicial federalism. In all
three of these decisions, the Arkansas Supreme Court decided that the Ar-
kansas Constitution affords more individual rights than similar federal con-
stitutional provisions.1 2 In light of the history of the new judicial federalism,
it is not surprising that all three cases involve an area of criminal law or
criminal procedure. 13 Although the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision to
use the Arkansas Constitution, rather than rely on the Federal Constitution,
is not a new concept, Arkansas's entry into the new judicial federalism will
have a significant impact on the state.1
4
The heightened use of the Arkansas Constitution will require a clear
development of state constitutional grounds supporting departures from
federal constitutional interpretation. 15 This reliance on state constitutional
authority will likely lead to criminal procedure doctrines that require more
from law enforcement officers and state prosecutors.' 6 This comment out-
lines the history of the judicial federalism movement by examining the im-
portance of the federal and state constitutions, exploring the impetus for the
movement, and providing examples of state court activism during the era. 17
Continuing, this piece analyzes the ramifications of the judicial federalism
movement. 18 Next, this comment explores Arkansas's recent entry into the
judicial federalism movement and the resulting implications.' 9 In addition, it
submits that the development of Arkansas constitutional jurisprudence is
only the beginning and proposes ideas for heightened state constitutional
awareness and activism, as well as makes suggestions for specific criminal
procedure doctrines.20
10. G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial Federalism in Perspective, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1097, 1100 n.10 (1997) [hereinafter New Judicial Federalism].
11. Brennan, Bill of Rights, supra note 9, at 539-40.
12. See generally discussion infra Part II.C; Tarr, New Judicial Federalism, supra note
10, at 1099-1100.
13. Infra text accompanying note 118.
14. See generally discussion infra Part 11I.
15. See infra Part II.B.
16. See discussion infra Part I.C. 1-2.
17. See generally discussion infra Part II.
18. See discussion infra Part II.B.4.
19. See generally discussion infra Part I.C.




The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal gov-
ernment are few and defined Those which are to remain in the State
governments are numerous and indefinite.
21
A. Constitutions
To most Americans, the word "constitution" represents a body of fed-
eral law. 22 Seldom do people think of state constitutions in terms of provid-
23ing a framework for government. In fact, the United States Constitution is
thought "to be the oldest, still operative, written constitution in the world.
24
The Constitution of Massachusetts is actually "the oldest, still operative,
written constitution in the world. ''25 Both the federal and state constitutions
work hand in hand.26 Neither body of law can survive alone.27 All of the
original thirteen states had constitutions or charters before the Federal Con-
stitution was drafted and adopted. 28 These original state constitutions pro-
vided the framework for the Federal Constitution.29
1. The Federal Constitution
Although many scholarly discussions concerning American liberties
and individual rights begin with a discussion of the Bill of Rights, neither
the ideology nor the codification of human freedoms began with those ten
21. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 303 (James Madison) (Modem Library ed., 1937).
22. See Ellis Katz, Introduction to ADVISORY COMM. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS, STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 7 (1989). In a 1988 public opin-
ion poll, "only forty-four percent of American adults knew that their state has its own consti-
tution" or its own bill of rights. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. The Massachusetts Constitution was mostly written by John Adams and was
adopted in 1780--seven years before the Federal Constitution was written. Id. The United
States Constitution is, however, the oldest, still operating national constitution in the world.
Id.
26. ADVISORY COMM. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, Findings to STATE
CONSTITUTIONS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1 (1989) [hereinafter Findings].
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1. All thirteen original states had fully functioning constitutions before 1787.
See id. Delaware, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, and Virginia all enacted constitutions in 1776. Id. at 7. In 1777 Georgia and
New York both adopted constitutions. Id. Lastly, Connecticut adopted its constitution in




amendments.3 ° While impressive antecedents were available, it was experi-
ence that shaped the Bill of Rights. 31 Prior to the Revolution, the British
Parliament enacted oppressive retaliatory legislation that the colonies en-
dured.32 During these difficult times, the colonies were forced to proclaim
entitlement to individual rights and individual government when their Eng-
lish government proved increasingly paternalistic. 33 This experience served
as the backdrop for the emancipation of the young colonies and the impor-
tance of developing a system of government that protected against abuses of
power. 34 Protection of individual rights was also important and led to the
inclusion of the Bill of Rights in the new Federal Constitution.35 The inclu-
sion of the Bill of Rights is important for two reasons. First, it signifies the
importance of individual liberties as a component of the Federal Constitu-
tion.36 Second, it demonstrates the importance of state involvement in the
adoption of the Federal Constitution.
37
30. See PATRICK T. CONLEY & JOHN P. KAMINSKI, Preface to THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND
THE STATES xi (Patrick T. Conley & John P. Kaminski eds., Madison House Publishers, Inc.
1992).
The basis of human freedom can be found much earlier in such disparate sources
as the Bible; the political culture of the classical world; the natural-law and natu-
ral-rights doctrines as formulated by ancient, medieval, and early modem writ-
ers; the rhetoric and the rationale of such movements as the Renaissance, the
Reformation, and the Enlightenment; social-contract philosophy; and, especially,
England's common law, its Whig libertarian tradition, and its great freedom
documents-Magna Carta (1215), the Petition of Rights (1628), and the Bill of
Rights (1689).
Id.
31. See id. at 6. Even prior to the proposal and subsequent adoption of the Bill of Rights,
the colonies were experimenting in the development of individual rights and liberties. See id.
For example some consider the Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts of 1648 "the first mod-
em code of the Western World." Id. In 1639 Connecticut drafted the "Fundamental Orders of
Connecticut," followed by the codes of Rhode Island and the Carolina colony. Id. at 6-7.
32. Id. at 9-11.
33. Id.atlO-11.
34. Id. at 13-14.
35. Gaspare J. Saladino, The Bill of Rights, A Bibliographic Essay, in THE BILL OF
RIGHTS AND THE STATES 461, 465 (2001).
36. Id. at 465. Many scholars agree that the United States Constitution would not have
been ratified but for the promise of the inclusion of the Bill of Rights. Id. at 463.
37. See id. at 465. The role of the Bill of Rights in American constitutional history has
been "monumental." Id. The magnitude of the Bill of Rights is surprising considering that the
framers considered the amendments to be unimportant. Id. The Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution is a prime example of the states' influence on the Federal Consti-
tution. The purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to prevent the use of writs of assistance
and general warrants. NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION 80 (1937). The framers of the Federal
Constitution were concerned with writs of assistance, which gave the King's officials unlim-
ited search and seizure power. Id. at 53. After the American Revolution, four states constitu-




The importance of establishing that the Massachusetts Constitution is,
in fact, "the oldest, still operative constitution" in the world goes beyond the
need to be historically correct.38 Its existence solidifies the fact that state
constitutions predated the Federal Constitution and highlights the impor-
tance of state involvement in the drafting of the Federal Constitution.
39
Moreover, its importance lies in understanding "the limited role that the
United States Constitution was designed to serve in the American federal
system." 40 Because all of the original states had constitutions or state char-
ters prior to the adoption of the Federal Constitution, the framers of the
United States Constitution built on the states' experiences. 41 Accordingly,
there are references to state constitutions in The Federalist.42 Understanding
the differences between the federal and state constitutions assists in recog-
nizing the full potential underlying state constitutions. 43 For example, be-
cause they govern local governments, state constitutions deal with issues
that the Federal Constitution barely acknowledges." Also, current state con-
stitutions continue to provide a framework for, and alternatives to, aspects
of government not covered by the Federal Constitution.45 Finally, some state
constitutions supplement and extend provisions found in the Federal Consti-
tution.46
Second, a number of federal doctrines tend to limit federal intrusions
into state affairs.47 Specifically, the "adequate and independent state
grounds" doctrine prevents the Supreme Court of the United States from
Faith, Big Brother and You: The United States Supreme Court's Latest Good Faith Excep-
tion to the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 18 U. ARK. L1TrLE ROCK L.J. 533, 537
(1996). "These state constitutional provisions served as models for the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution." Id.
38. Katz, supra note 22, at 7.
39. See supra note 25 and accompanying text; Katz, supra note 22, at 7-8.
40. Katz, supra note 22, at 7.
41. Id. at 7-8.
42. Id. at 8.
43. Findings, supra note 26, at 1.
44. Katz, supra note 22, at 11. In addition to differing focal points, state constitutions
may be based on different philosophies of government. Id. State constitutions are also easier
to amend, provide for direct citizen participation, and include more detail than similar provi-
sions found in the United States Constitution. Id.
45. ADVISORY COMM. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL Relations, Introduction to STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (1990). [herinafter Introduction]. For ex-
ample state constitutions include provisions related to structure, function, and finance of state
and local government, regulation of property, public education, and elections. Id.; Katz,
supra note 22, at 11.
46. Findings, supra note 26, at 1, 11; see also Washington v. Ladson, 979 P.2d 833
(Wash. 1999).
47. Findings, supra note 26, at 1-2.
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reviewing high state court rulings resting independently on state law
grounds.48 The "dormant commerce clause," "abstention," and "equitable
restraint" doctrines are other examples of limitations into state governmen-
tal affairs.49
B. Judicial Federalism
The importance of state constitutional jurisprudence became increas-
ingly evident during the late 1970s and early 1980s. 50 This era marked a
change in constitutional history in which state courts began using their own
constitutions as a means of providing increased individual liberties.51 This
section traces the development of the new judicial federalism by examining
the historical role of state courts and individual rights, modifications of
criminal procedure doctrines, and state courts' response to the resulting
modifications.
1. State Constitutions and Individual Rights
All state constitutions contain provisions protecting individual rights. 2
Civil liberties is a debated area of state constitutional jurisprudence.53 In fact
states historically have been the primary protectors of civil liberties.5 4 This
is because initially the Federal Bill of Rights did not apply to the states.55
48. Id. at 2; Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1037 (1983).
49. Findings, supra note 26, at 2. For example, the Dormant Commerce Clause allows
the federal government to show deference to state commercial rulemaking when the rule
promotes traditional police power, is non-discriminatory, and does not vary too much from
national standards so as to impose conflicting cumulative burdens. Id.; see C & A Carbone,
Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995). "Abstention" and "equitable restraint" restrict federal court original jurisdiction
in favor of state constitutional and statutory interpretation. Findings, supra note 26, at 2; see
Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
50. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
51. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
52. ADVISORY COMM. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, State Constitutional Pro-
tections Beyond Minimum Federal Constitutional Rights, in STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 68 (1990 & Supp. 1990-91) [hereinafter State Constitutional Protec-
tions]. The Federal Constitution's Bill of Rights was more or less patterned after state consti-
tutions. Id. For example, both the federal and state constitutions may contain phrases such as
"due process" and "unreasonable search and seizure." Id.
53. Tarr, States and Federal Liberties, supra note 4, at 49.
54. Id. After the Civil War, many feared that the states would not provide protection to
the newly freed slaves. Brennan, Bill of Rights, supra note 9, at 537. Thus, the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted to ensure that states would continue with their historic trend of
protecting individual liberties. Id. at 537-38.
55. Tarr, States and Federal Liberties, supra note 4, at 49. In 1833 in Barron v. Balti-
more, Chief Justice Marshall stated "[the Federal Constitution] was ordained and established
[Vol. 25
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The United States Supreme Court interpreted the Bill of Rights as only ap-
plying to federal infringements on civil liberties.56 Thus, "state constitutions
were necessarily the primary vehicle for protecting individual rights," and
state law and state courts dominated the protection of individual rights until
the early 1930s.
57
In the 1930s a shift occurred that marked the beginning of the federal
government's role as the primary protector of individual rights.58 The appli-
cation of the Federal Bill of Rights to the states prompted this shift.59 "Se-
lective incorporation" emerged as the process whereby the United States
Supreme Court selectively applied the Bill of Rights to the states.60 For the
next forty years, the Court continued its selective application of the Bill of
Rights by examining issues on a case-by-case basis.6' Therefore, federal
courts gradually became more active in this area.62 As a result, "civil liber-
ties law ... became almost exclusively federal. 63
Selective incorporation had a major impact on state constitutional ju-
risprudence. 64 States not only were obligated to abide by the Federal Bill of
Rights, but also diverted from their role as protectors of civil liberties.65
During this period litigants first sought to have their claims heard in federal
by the people of the United States for themselves, for their own government, and not for the
government of the individual states." Brennan, Bill of Rights, supra note 9, at 537 (quoting
Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833)).
56. Tarr, States and Federal Liberties, supra note 4, at 49.
57. Tarr, New Judicial Federalism, supra note 10, at 1099.
58. Id.at 1100.
59. Tarr, States and Federal Liberties, supra note 4, at 49. In its first application, the
United States Supreme Court held that the First Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion applied to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. Id. (citing
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925)).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Tarr, New Judicial Federalism, supra note 10, at 1100.
63. Id. By the 1960s the court aggressively incorporated most of the Federal Bill of
Rights dedicated to the area of criminal justice to the states. Tarr, States and Federal Liber-
ties, supra note 4, at 49. Prior to 1961, only four amendments of the Federal Bill of Rights
were applied to the states-the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. Duncan v. Lou-
isiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (applying the Sixth Amendment to the states); Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25 (1949) (applying the Fourth Amendment to the states); Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 652
(applying the First Amendment to the states); Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S.
226 (1897) (applying the Fifth Amendment to the states). Later that year, the Court applied
the exclusionary rule, the "corollary" to the Fourth Amendment, to the states in Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). Brennan, Bill of Rights, supra note 9, at 539. The exclusion-
ary rule allows courts to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Id.
64. See Tarr, States and Federal Liberties, supra note 4, at 49.
65. Id.; Tarr, New Judicial Federalism, supra note 10, at 1100.
2003]
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66court. Even in state law forums, litigants began relying on the Federal Bill
of Rights, basing their state law claims on federal law and looking to the
United States Supreme Court for doctrine and legal precedent.67
2. The Revolution
In the early 1970s, a small number of states began to challenge this
seemingly exclusive reliance on federal doctrine and precedent for individ-
ual rights.68 This trend, identified as the "new judicial federalism, '69 became
increasingly popular among the states.7° Scholars identify over 300 cases in
which state courts based their decisions on their own constitutions or chose
to extend individual rights protections further than Federal Constitution
counterparts between 1970 and the mid 1980s. 71 In 1997 the number tallied
at over 700.72 Some states also chose to provide protections not found in the
Federal Constitution.73
3. The New Judicial Federalism, Criminal Justice, and the United
States Supreme Court
Vigorous judicial federalism can be seen in the area of procedural
rights for criminal defendants.74 State court decisions often hold that their
constitution affords criminal defendants more rights than the corresponding
section of the Federal Constitution as interpreted by the United State Su-
66. Tarr, New Judicial Federalism, supra note 10, at 1100. Litigants began using federal
law as a means to having their claims heard in federal court. Id.
67. Id.; Tarr, States and Federal Liberties, supra note 4, at 49.
68. Tarr, States and Federal Liberties, supra note 4, at 49.
69. Id.
70. Id. Some scholars say that the "new judicial federalism" was never new. See Tarr,
New Judicial Federalism, supra note 10, at 1099-1100. It was merely a "rediscovery" of a
neglected tradition in state constitutional law. Id. Others maintain that history establishes that
the new judicial federalism represents not a rediscovery of the past, but an unprecedented use
of state power. Id. at 1106.
71. Tarr, New Judicial Federalism, supra note 10, at 1112. Contrast this number with
only ten cases between 1950 and 1969. Id. at 1112-13. Further, a survey conducted in 1985
revealed that over seventy-five percent of state judges thought that litigants were raising state
constitutional arguments more often than they had in the past. Id. at 1113.
72. Id. at 1114.
73. Tarr, States and Federal Liberties, supra note 4, at 49. There are many interesting
examples of distinctive state constitutional protections. Id. at 50, tbl. 1. For example, Penn-
sylvania provides a constitutional right to pure water. Id. California's state constitution pro-
vides a right to safe schools. Id. In both California and Rhode Island, there is a state constitu-





preme Court.75 This judicial activism in the area of criminal defendants'
rights can be attributed to changes in the composition of the United States
Supreme Court and to the resulting limitations on criminal procedure doc-
trine.76
The Supreme Court, in the 1950s and 1960s, under the leadership of
Chief Justice Earl Warren, is most remembered for its proactive involve-
ment in the area of individual rights.77 The Warren Court is also remem-
bered for its active protection of criminal defendants' rights.78 In light of the
Court's decisions, "[s]ome have described the Warren Court's far-reaching
criminal procedure cases as a 'revolution.'
' 79
The Warren Court's expansion of criminal defendants' rights began to
slow down when control of the Court shifted to the new Chief Justice-
John Burger. 80 While the Court did not explicitly overturn any Warren
Court precedent, it did not hesitate in limiting its application.81 Thus, many
new federalism critics dismissed the revolution as being merely an attempt
"to evade Burger Court rulings and safeguard the civil libertarian gains of
the Warren Court.,
82
While the Burger Court's goal, it seemed, was to limit the expansion of
protections for criminal defendants, all members of the bench did not share
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Harris, supra note 8, at 370 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954)). Brown was the seminal United State Supreme Court case decided during the Warren
Court era, holding segregated schools unconstitutional. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 483.
78. Harris, supra note 8, at 370. The Warren court was particularly concerned with
racially-tainted police practices. Id. This concern was expressed in the Court deliberations in
Terry v. Ohio. Id. at 373-74 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). During the Warren
Court era, the United States Supreme Court applied the exclusionary rule to the states. See
supra note 63 and accompanying text. Interestingly, Oklahoma had long recognized the
exclusionary rule. See Hess v. State, 202 P. 310 (Okla. 1921) (discussing the applicability of
the exclusionary rule as a state constitutional right). One of the reasons for the broad
interpretation of the state constitution was the difference in language found in the Federal
Constitution and Oklahoma Constitution. William W. Greenhalgh & Jeanne N. Lobelson,
The States and Criminal Procedure, in ADVISORY COMM. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS, STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 69, 70-71 (1989). The Warren
Court also held that criminal defendants must be afforded the right to counsel when in
custody. Harris, supra note 8, at 367 n.2 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)).
Lastly, the Court guaranteed that criminal defendants were aware of their rights by requiring
the Miranda warning. Id. at 367 n.3 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
79. Harris, supra note 8, at 367. When the Warren Court began its expansive application
of Federal Constitution provisions to state regulation of criminal procedures, states aban-
doned their constitutions and leaned toward the Supreme Court's rulings. Id.
80. Id.
81. See discussion infra notes 86-88.
82. Tarr, New Judicial Federalism, supra note 10, at 1098.
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this view.83 One justice voiced his concern for the Court's lack of attention
to expansive individual rights.84 One such outspoken Justice was William J.
Brennan.85 Justice Brennan explicitly encouraged state courts to abandon
federal precedent and look to their own constitutions for a solution to the
United States Supreme Court's increasing judicial conservatism. 86 Justice
Brennan felt that the Supreme Court's "contraction of federal rights" should
be interpreted as a "plain invitation to state courts" to step up and reclaim
their role as primary protectors of individual rights.87 Justice Brennan noted
that "[r]ediscovery by state supreme courts of the broader protections af-
forded their own citizens by their state constitutions ... is probably the most
important development in constitutional jurisprudence of our times. 88
The Burger Court's, and subsequent Supreme Courts', highly visible
change toward criminal procedure doctrines heightened focus on criminal
procedure during the new judicial federalism. 89 Warrantless searches, par-
ticularly those involving consent searches and pretextual stops and arrests,
were among the issues addressed during the new judicial federalism. In the
following section, this comment discusses the doctrines of consent searches
and pretextual stops and arrests, as well as the states' response to the result-
ing limitations on criminal defendants' rights.90
a. The Consent Problem
In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,9 1 the United States Supreme Court de-
termined that law enforcement officers are not required to inform suspects
83. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977) [hereinafter Brennan, State Constitutions].
84. Id. at 502.
85. Id.
86. Brennan, Bill of Rights, supra note 9, at 550; Brennan, State Constitutions, supra
note 83, at 491. In addition to writing law review articles and speaking publicly, Justice
Brennan made his stance known in several dissents. See, e.g., Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S.
96, 111 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Michigan v. Mosley, Justice Brennan noted that
"in light of [the] erosion of Miranda standards as a matter of federal constitutional law, it is
appropriate to observe that no State is precluded by the decision from adhering to higher
standards under state law." 423 U.S. at 120 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
87. Brennan, Bill of Rights, supra note 9, at 548.
88. Tarr, New Judicial Federalism, supra note 10, at 1112.
89. Friesen, supra note 7, at 1270-71; see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906-07
(1984) (holding that the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit the use of evidence simply
because it was the result of an illegal search or seizure and recognizing a good-faith excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (moving from a two-
prong test for probable cause determination to a totality of the circumstances test). The Court
also expanded law enforcement authority to apply to searches incident to an arrest. See
United States v. Robinson, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); New York v. Belton, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
96. See infra Part II.B.3.a-c.
91. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
[Vol. 25
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of their right to withhold consent to a warrantless search.92 The Court held
that the validity of a consent search is not measured by whether the law
enforcement officer conducting the search informed the suspect that she has
a right to refuse consent.93 Rather, the requirement is that consent be given
voluntarily.
94
An important issue surrounding consent searches is the element of vol-
untariness. Both judges and scholars note that most people will not reject a
police officer's request to search, even when the search would be detrimen-
tal to the individual.95 In fact some believe that obeying authority is a notion
so ingrained that "people mechanically obey legitimate authority."
96
"[C]ommon sense teaches that most [people] do not have the chutzpah or
stupidity to tell a police officer to 'get lost."' 97 Thus, consent becomes an
important issue when law enforcement officers conduct warrantless
searches.
b. The Pretext Problem
In Whren v. United States,98 the United States Supreme Court held that
defendants may not raise pretextual challenges to Fourth Amendment
searches and seizures incident to a traffic stop when the law enforcement
92. Id. at 234; see Marcy Strauss, Reconstruction Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 211, 218 (2001).
93. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 226-27.
94. Id. at 223. The Court went on to articulate a set of factors used in determining
whether or not consent to warrantless search was voluntary. Id. at 226. The Court looks to
the totality of the circumstances. Id.; see Brendan W. Williams, Horizontal Federalism
Inches Along: New Jersey's Experiment in State Constitutionalization and Consents and
Searches Finally Finds Company, 5 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 1, 1-2 (2000). The Court will
also look to whether the defendants were informed of their right to withhold consent, their
intelligence, and their level of education. Strauss, supra note 92, at 218.
95. Strauss, supra note 92, at 236.
96. Id. (citing Adrian J. Barrio, Rethinking Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: Incorporating
Obedience Theory into the Supreme Court's Conception of Voluntary Consent, 1997 U. ILL.
L. REv. 215, 231 (1997)). In a study conducted by Leonard Bickman, Bickman found that
experiment facilitators wearing uniforms received a greater degree of compliance when
compared with facilitators wearing jackets and ties. Id. at 238 (citing Leonard Bickman, The
Social Power of a Uniform, 4 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 47, 51-57 (1974)). Further, facilita-
tors wearing guard uniforms, even without weapons, received a greater rate of compliance
than facilitators wearing a milkman's uniform. Id. The results of the experiment concluded
that when instructed to pick up trash by the various facilitators, eighty-two percent complied
when the guard directed the experiment, sixty-four percent complied with directed by the
milkman, and only thirty-six percent complied when directed by a regular citizen. Id.
97. Id. at 236 (citing Tracey Maclin, "Black and Blue Encounters "-Some Preliminary
Thoughts About the Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REV.
243, 250 (1991).
98. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
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officer had probable cause to make the stop.99 The Court reasoned that so
long as the officer is able to demonstrate probable cause for the stop, pretext
has no place. 00 The Court stated "[a]s a general matter, the decision to stop
an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe
that a traffic violation has occurred."''° Thus, the Court concluded that the
existence of probable cause was sufficient to remove the case from a pretex-
tual inquiry.
0 2
c. The States Resolution
In response to the post-Warren Court's conservatism, state courts took
Justice Brennan's advice and began expanding protection for criminal de-
fendants' rights.'0 3 Following in the Warren Court's footsteps, states took
"seriously their obligation as coequal guardians of individual rights."' 4
Therefore, faced with a narrowing of individual rights, state courts had to
learn to stand on their own two feet, and in the process, they gave criminal
defendants a leg to stand on too. 0 5
99. Id. at 813.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 810.
102. Id. at 819. There is always, however, a danger that law enforcement officers will
abuse warrantless search authority. Catherine Hancock, State Court Activism and Searches
Incident to Arrest, 68 VA. L. REV. 1085, 1107 (1982). Unfettered police discretion makes per
se search rules easier to manipulate. Id. at 1108. For example, if law enforcement officers
want to search a suspect, they only need to find probable cause to arrest him for some minor
offense. Id. The fact that officers may concoct minor violations, coupled with the courts'
tendency to view officers as highly credible witnesses, makes proving pretextual motive
challenging. Edwin Butterfoss, Solving the Pretext Puzzle: The Importance of Ulterior Mo-
tives and Fabrications in the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment Pretext Doctrine, 79 KY.
L.J. 1, 55 (1990-1991). Additionally, discussions of pretext point to racial profiling as an
example of the problem surrounding warrantless searches and seizures. See Jack Kearney,
Racial Profiling: A Disgrace at the Intersection of Race and the Criminal Justice System, 36
ARK. LAW. No. 2, at 20 (2001). Seventy-two percent of black males between the ages of
eighteen and thirty-four report that they have been the victims of racial profiling. Id. Finally,
the problem with pretext practices is that they go against the essence of the Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments. Butterfoss, supra, at 15-16. Thus, the question becomes how do courts
formulate an adequate pretext test?
103. See Greenhalgh & Lobelson, supra note 78, at 69. Thus, a component of the new
judicial federalism movement can be characterized as reactive. Ronald K.L. Collins & Peter
J. Galie, Models of Post-Incorporation Judicial Review: 1985 Survey of State Constitutional
Individual Rights Decisions, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 317, 318 (1986). Because judicial federalism
emerged as a result of the United States Supreme Court's conservatism, critics have called
the trend "unprincipled and result-oriented." Hancock, supra note 102, at 1086 (citing Bice,
Anderson and the Adequate State Ground, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 750 (1972)).
104. Brennan, Bill of Rights, supra note 9, at 548.
105. From 1970 to 1989, over 450 opinions were handed down in which state courts
expanded rights under their constitution greater than the identical federal provision. Harris,
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Beginning with the Court's decision in Illinois v. Gates,10 6 states began
their separation from the United States Supreme Court.10 7 The departures
continued following the United States v. Leon opinion.10 8 In 1985 alone,
over a dozen opinions were handed down involving protections not covered
by the Federal Constitution. 09 The United States Supreme Court's increas-
ing judicial conservatism thus provoked state court's increasing judicial
activism.l°
Responses to the Court's increasing judicial conservatism can be seen
in state courts' treatment of warrantless searches. A few state courts have
rejected the United States Supreme Court's determination that voluntary
consent does not require a knowledgeable waiver. 11 New Jersey was the
first state court to reject the Supreme Court's holding in Bustamonte.1 '2 The
New Jersey Supreme Court decided to apply a more rigorous standard than
the one the United States Supreme Court articulated." 3 Using its own state
constitution, the New Jersey Supreme Court determined that voluntary con-
sent requires the suspect to have knowledge of her right to withhold con-
supra note 8, at 369. It is reported that over one-third of those decisions involved some area
of criminal defendants rights. Id.
106. 462 U.S. 213 (1983); see supra note 89 and accompanying text.
107. Telephone Interview with Thomas Sullivan, Professor, University of Arkansas at
Little Rock William H. Bowen School of Law (June 28, 2002). For example, the Alaska
Supreme Court determined that the totality of the circumstances standard adopted by the
Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates for deciding whether probable cause exists was not suffi-
cient. Greenhalgh & Lobelson, supra note 78, at 71 (citing State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317
(Alaska 1987)). The court opted instead for a more protective, flexible standard. Id.
108. 468 U.S. 897 (1984); see supra note 91 and accompanying text; Collins & Galie,
supra note 103, at 319. The New Jersey Supreme Court expressly refused to adopt the Su-
preme Court's "judicially-created remedy" in United States v. Leon providing a good faith
exception to warrant requirement State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820, 822 (N.J. 1987); see
also Greenhalgh & Lobelson, supra note 78, at 71.
109. See, e.g., State v. Kimbro, 496 A.2d 498 (Conn. 1985); State v. Tanaka, 701 P.2d
1274 (Haw. 1985) (holding that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage);
Commonwealth v. Shepard, 476 N.E.2d 541 (Mass. 1985).
110. Hancock, supra note 102, at 1086. At least half of the states have rejected a Burger
Court precedent. Id. at 1110 n.93 (noting Alaska, California, and Hawaii in addition to
twenty-one other state decisions rejecting Burger Court precedent). Six states have rejected
or amended the Robinson holding. Id. at 1117 (listing Colorado, Washington, Michigan,
Alaska, California, and Hawaii as states that have rejected the Robinson holding).
111. Williams, supra note 94, at 1-2. (citing State v. Johnson, 346 A.2d 66 (N.J. 1975)).
A knowledgeable waiver is a requirement that the law enforcement officer inform the suspect
of her constitutional right to withhold consent to a warrantless search. See id.
112. Id. (citing Johnson, 346 A.2d at 68).
113. Id. at 1.
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sent.114 The court stated that a suspect cannot waive a right when he or she
is "unaware of its existence.
' 115
Likewise, the Washington Supreme Court departed from the Busta-
monte holding. 116 In a case involving a "knock and talk procedure," the
Washington Supreme Court held that its constitution extends beyond the
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.",
7
In analyzing the case, the Washington Supreme Court relied on the Gunwall
factors. 118 The court determined that the Washington Constitution affords
"heightened protection" against intrusions of the home.' 19 Thus, because the
law enforcement officers did not inform the defendant of her right to refuse
consent to search her home, the "knock and talk" procedure violated the
Washington Constitution.
120
Additionally, Mississippi has rejected the Supreme Court's reasoning
in Bustamonte,121stating that effective consent to a warrantless search under
the Mississippi Constitution requires the suspect be informed of his right to
refuse consent. 122 Continuing its trend-setting judicial activism in the late
1990s, 123 the Washington Supreme Court, in Washington v. Ladson, 24 re-
jected the United States Supreme Court's holding in Whren.125 The court
opined that pretextual stops are inherently unreasonable and, thus, go
against the basic reasonableness standard. 126 Further, pretextual stops are
unreasonable because they are predicated on false reason.' 
27
4. Important Implications of the New Judicial Federalism
A product of the new judicial federalism was an emergence of a recon-
structed federal doctrine that sought to encourage well-drafted lower court
114. Id. at 2. Interestingly, the Johnson parties did not argue application of the New
Jersey Constitution. The court raised it sua sponte. Id. at 9.
115. Id. at 10.
116. Id. at 17 (citing State v. Ferrier, 960 P.2d 927 (Wash. 1998)).
117. Williams, supra note 94, at 17 (citing Ferrier, 960 P.2d at 927).
118. Id. at 16-17 (citing State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 805, 811 (Wash. 1986)). For an
explanation of the Gunwall factors see infra Part.II.B.4.
119. Williams, supra note 94, at 16.
120. Id. at 17.
121. Graves v. Mississippi, 708 So. 2d 858, 863 (1998) (citing Penick v. State, 440 So.
2d 547, 549 (Miss. 1983)).
122. Id. The Graves opinion, however, limits Mississippi's departure by placing the
burden of proving uninformed consent on the defendant. Id. at 863-84.
123. See Harris, supra note 8, at 377.
124. 979 P.2d 833 (Wash. 1999).
125. Harris, supra note 8, at 377.
126. Id.; see also Ladson, 979 P.2d at 838.
127. Harris, supra note 8, at 377-78. The Court also noted the racial context surrounding
pretextual stops. Id. at 378.
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opinions. 28 In Michigan v. Long, 129 the United States Supreme Court held
that the Michigan trial court's decision in Long was not based on adequate
and independent state grounds because the opinion was not drafted in a way
that specifically set out independent state grounds. 130 Some scholars argue
that the Court's intention in Long was not to foster a respect for state court
opinions decided on independent state grounds, but to limit the state's deci-
sions. 31 By choosing to expand the Court's jurisdiction, rather than presum-
ing adequate and independent state grounds as had been done in the past,
the Court positioned itself to review individual rights cases decided on state
constitutional grounds.'
32
As a result of the Long decision, state courts may consider developing
specific methodologies for establishing adequate and independent state
grounds. 33 Various scholars have identified specific methodologies that
states may use to preserve decisions based on individual state grounds.'
34
For example, a self-reliant approach focuses first on state constitutional
law. 135 This model relies on state constitutional law as a fundamental source
of law. 136 This approach examines state constitutional law, state history,
doctrine, and structure. 137 Federal law is no more persuasive than other state
128. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
129. Id. at 1032.
130. Id. at 1043. In the lower court's opinion, the Michigan Supreme Court referenced its
constitution twice, but otherwise relied on federal precedent. Id. at 1037. The case involved a
challenge to a search and seizure. Id. at 1035. The defendant argued that the Michigan Con-
stitution afforded greater search and seizure protection than the United State's Supreme
Court affords under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1037-38. The defendant further argued,
because the Michigan court's decision rests on adequate and independent state grounds, the
United States Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Id. at 1037.
131. See id. at 1066, 1072 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Collins & Galie, supra note 103, at
339-40.
132. Collins & Galie, supra note 103, at 340. By the late 1990s, the new judicial federal-
ism had become a stable part of American federalism. Tarr, New Judicial Federalsim, supra
note 10, at 1098. In fact some states suggested that they would entertain state constitutional
claims first, resorting to federal constitutional claims only when the state inquiry did not
sufficiently resolve the case. Id. As a matter of fact, in 1990, state supreme courts decided
over 140 individual rights cases, relying exclusively on their state constitution or on a com-
bination of state and federal law. Id. at 1113.
133. Robert F. Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court Comment on
Federal Constitutional Issues When Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional Grounds, 63
TEX. L. REv. 1025, 1026 (1985).
134. In a comprehensive analysis, Ronald Collins identifies five sub-categorical ap-
proaches to reviewing constitutional claims under state constitutional law. Collins & Galie,
supra note 103, at 322-39. Robert F. Utter identifies three approaches to analyzing state
constitutions. Utter, supra note 133, at 1027-30.






law, so states are free to develop state law that varies from federal prece-
dent. 38
Additionally, state courts may choose to highlight differences in their
state constitutions and the Federal Constitution. For example, state courts
seeking to preserve their rulings may call attention to textual differences
between their constitutions and the Federal Constitution. 139 State courts may
also choose to follow federal precedent so long as the federal rule agrees
with state jurisprudence or policy. 140 These categorical approaches may
assist states in meeting the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine
as outlined by the Supreme Court in Long.
In Washington v. Gunwall,14 1 the Washington Supreme Court articu-
lated six factors to use in determining when the Washington Constitution
would afford broader rights than those found in the Federal Constitution:
"(1) [T]he textual language; (2) differences in the texts; (3) constitutional
history; (4) preexisting state law; (5) structural differences; and (6) matters
of particular local or state concern."1 42 The purpose of the Gunwall factors
was to assist litigants in briefing and arguing independent state constitu-
tional grounds.143 Further, the six factors ensure that decisions to depart
from federal precedent will be well reasoned.14 4 Protection of individual
rights should also come from an articulable and reasonable process.
45
In addition to their own state law, states began looking to each other
for guidance in developing state law rulemaking. 46 This practice is known
as "horizontal federalism" and is used when interpreting similar constitu-
tional provisions. 47 For example, the Washington Supreme Court heavily
relied on the New Jersey Supreme Court's interpretation of its own constitu-
tion in its departure from the Bustamonte holding. 48 Likewise, scholars
argue that when interpreting state constitutional law, interpretation of simi-
lar provisions from other states is more persuasive than federal constitu-
138. Id.
139. Collins & Galie, supra note 103, at 328. Collins & Galie identify an approach simi-
lar to the Primacy model-the non-equivalent analysis model. Id. at 333. As a result of the
focus on analysis of state law, and the treatment of federal precedent as merely instructional,
it is typically clear that decisions arising out of this model rest on independent state grounds.
Id.
140. See id. at 325. A number of the new judicial federalism expansions follow this ap-
proach. Id.
141. 720 P.2d 808 (Wash. 1986).
142. Id. at 811.
143. Id. at 813.
144. See id.
145. Id.
146. Williams, supra note 94, at 2.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 3.
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tional interpretation.149 Moreover, states benefit from other state courts'
experimentations with provisions of their constitutions.
C. Arkansas Enters the New Judicial Federalism
During its 2002 term, the Arkansas Supreme Court decided three cases
in which it applied the principle of the new judicial federalism.150 The court
determined that it would no longer limit its analysis of Arkansas constitu-
tional provisions lockstep with the United States Supreme Court. 5 ' This
section analyzes the court's entry into the new judicial federalism by exam-
ining the court's rationale for choosing to analyze legal issues under the
Arkansas Constitution.152
1. Narrowing Knock and Talk
In Griffin v. State,153 the Arkansas Supreme Court stated that it would
interpret the Arkansas Constitution as providing more rights than those af-
forded by the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. 114 Griffin,
therefore, became one of the first examples of the Arkansas Supreme
Court's recent entry into the new judicial federalism. The Griffin case in-
volved a challenge to a "knock and talk" procedure where the defendant
was arrested after a nighttime knock and search of his home.'55
The court began its analysis with the notion that a "man's home is his
castle, and that even the King is prohibited from unreasonably intruding
upon that home."' 5 6 The court continued by noting that the concept of pro-
hibiting unreasonable searches and seizures is not foreign to Arkansas state
law. 157 The court pointed out that in the original 1836 version of the State's
constitution the law stated:
That the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and pos-
sessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, and that general war-
rants, whereby any officer may be commanded to search suspected
places without evidence of the fact committed, or to seize any person or
persons not named whose offenses are not particularly described and
149. Id.
150. See discussion infra Part II.C.
151. See State v. Sullivan III, 348 Ark. 647, 651, 74 S.W.3d 215, 218 (2002); Griffin v.
State, 347 Ark. 788, 791, 67 S.W.3d 582, 585 (2002).
152. See discussion infra Part II.C. 1-3.
153. 347 Ark. 788,67 S.W.3d 582 (2002).
154. Id. at 791-92, 67 S.W.3d at 584.
155. Id. at 797, 67 S.W.3d at 588.
156. Id. at 792, 67 S.W.3d at 585.
157. Id., 67 S.W.3d at 585.
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supported by evidence, are dangerous to liberty, and shall not be
granted. 
158
The above principle is carried over in the current Arkansas Constitution by
the language contained in article 2, section 15: "[T]he right of the people of
this State to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated."' 5 9 Although the
current state constitutional language mirrors the Federal Constitution's
Fourth Amendment, the Court chose to depart from the federal interpreta-
tion of search and seizure law and the Court's application of the Fourth
Amendment. 160 Thus, the Court made its reliance on state law expressly
known. 161
After establishing that it was relying on state law, the court noted dif-
ferences in the federal and Arkansas standard for executing nighttime search
warrants. 62 Thus, the court supplemented its reliance on state law by dem-
onstrating additional state law protections against nighttime searches.
63
Following its establishment of heightened requirements for executing night-
time searches, the court turned its attention specifically to the knock and
talk procedure. 164 The court stated that an officer may conduct a search
without a warrant if consent is given.165 Thus, in a situation where consent
is voluntarily given, a knock and talk procedure will be upheld. 66 In its
holding the Arkansas Supreme Court adopted the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's definition of knock and talk, as well as the
"daytime" and "honest intent to inquire" elements listed in the United States
v. Davis167 definition. 68 In its discussion of knock and talk consent
searches, the Ninth Circuit court stated:
158. Id., 67 S.W.3d at 585.
159. Griffin, 347 Ark. at 793, 67 S.W.3d at 585 (quoting ARK. CONST. art. II, § 15).
160. Id., 67 S.W.3d at 585.
161. Id., 67 S.W.3d at 585. Additionally, the Court pointed out that the defendant's first
point on appeal was that his rights were violated under article 2, section 15 of the Arkansas
Constitution. Id. at 791, 67 S.W.3d at 584.
162. Id. at 792-93, 67 S.W.3d at 585. According to the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure, there are only three situations in which a warrant may be executed at night: "(1)
when the place to be searched is difficult of speedy access"; (2) when there is an imminent
threat of removal of contraband; and (3) when safety precautions mandate that the warrant be
executed at night. Id. at 793, 67 S.W.3d at 586 (relying on ARK. R. CRIM. P. 13.2).
163. Id., 67 S.W.3d at 585.
164. Id., 67 S.W.3d at 585.
165. Griffin, 347 Ark. at 794, 67 S.W.3d at 586 (citing ARK. R. CRIM. P. 11.1).
166. Id., 67 S.W.3d at 586.
167. Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301, 303 (9th Cir. 1964).




Absent express orders from the person in possession against any possi-
ble trespass, there is no rule of private or public conduct which makes it
illegal per se, or a condemned invasion of the person's right of privacy,
for anyone openly and peaceably, at high noon, to walk up the steps and
knock on the front door of any man's "castle" with the honest intent of
asking questions of the occupant thereof whether the questioner be a
pollster, a salesman, or an officer of the law.
169
The court did note, however, that some jurisdictions require law enforce-
ment officers to inform suspects of their right to refuse consent. 7 °
In its analysis the court found that the knock and talk procedure con-
ducted in Griffin did not meet the "high noon" or the "honest intent to ask
questions" elements.' 71 First, the law enforcement officers conducted the
knock and talk procedure at night. 72 Second, the officers did not persuade
the court that they conducted the knock and talk procedure with the honest
intent of asking questions. 73 Finally, the officers began the search before
the defendant could consent. 174 Because the defendant was not given the
opportunity to voluntarily consent, the court found that the knock and talk
procedure was not valid. 1
75
In addition to the court's proclamation of self-reliance, the concurring
opinions are even more revolutionary. 176 Several justices, although agreeing
with the majority, opined that the Arkansas Constitution requires more than
compliance with the Davis "high noon" requirement. 77 These justices'
opinions further illustrate concerns surrounding consent searches.' 78 Justice
Corbin wrote to urge the state to require oral acknowledgement of the right
to refuse consent. 79 Justice Corbin stated that he is concerned, generally,
with the knock and talk procedure. 80 The officer's conscious decision not to
169. Id., 67 S.W.3d at 587 (quoting Davis, 327 F.2d at 303 (emphasis added)).
170. Id., 67 S.W.3d at 587 (citing State v. Ferrier, 960 P.2d 927 (Wash. 1998)).
171. Id. at 798, 67 S.W.3d at 588. Although the law enforcement officers received an
anonymous tip that the defendant was selling drugs earlier in the day, they did not conduct
the knock and talk until 10:10 p.m. Id., 67 S.W.3d at 588.
172. Id. at 796, 67 S.W.3d at 588.
173. Id., 67 S.W.3d. at 587. One of the officers testified that they carried out the knock
and talk procedure because they were certain they would not be able to obtain a warrant. Id.,
67 S.W.3d at 587.
174. Griffin, 347 Ark. at 796, 67 S.W.3d at 588. The officers walked around the rear of
the defendant's home before requesting his consent to the search. Id., 67 S.W.3d at 588.
175. Id. at 800, 67 S.W.3d at 590.
176. Id., 67 S.W.3d at 590 (Corbin, Brown, and Hannah, JJ., concurring).
177. Id., 67 S.W.3d at 590 (Corbin, Brown, and Hannah, JJ., concurring).
178. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
179. Griffin, 347 Ark. at 801, 67 S.W.3d at 591 (Corbin, J., concurring).
180. Id. at 800, 67 S.W.3d at 590 (Corbin, J., concurring). Justice Corbin was also con-
cerned with the lack of probable cause or reasonable suspicion in cases where law enforce-
ment officers conduct a knock and talk. See id., 67 S.W.3d at 590 (Corbin, J., concurring).
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inform the defendant of his right to refuse consent disturbed Corbin. 8'
Thus, in addition to limiting knock and talk procedures to daytime, Justice
Corbin recommended that the Arkansas Constitution be interpreted to re-
quire an explanation of the right to refuse consent before the court will up-
hold searches conducted pursuant to a.knock and talk procedure.1
82
Similarly, Justices Brown and Hannah shared concern regarding the
knock and talk procedure. 183 They believe that defendants should be in-
formed of their right to refuse consent under Arkansas constitutional law
and that police officers should be required to have the waiver acknowledg-
ing consent in writing. 84 Requiring a waiver of consent in writing will pro-
vide tangible proof that consent was actually given. 185 Further, written con-
sent forms would offer additional assurance that the defendant is aware of
his or her right to refuse consent. 86 Therefore, the question remains "what
will Arkansas do with the knock and talk procedure in the future?"'
187
181. Id. at 801, 67 S.W.3d at 590 (Corbin, J., concurring).
182. Id., 67 S.W.3d at 590 (Corbin, J., concurring).
183. Id., 67 S.W.3d at 591 (Brown, J., concurring).
184. Id. at 803, 67 S.W.3d at 592 (Brown, J., concurring).
185. Griffin, 347 Ark. at 803, 67 S.W.3d at 592 (Brown, J., concurring).
186. Id., 67 S.W.3d at 592 (Brown, J., concurring). Justice Brown does note that written
consent forms will not cure all concerns involving consent searches. Id., 67 S.W.3d at 592.
However, they will provide some additional protection. Id., 67 S.W.3d at 592.
187. Id., 67 S.W.3d at 592. In light of the concerns the three members of the Arkansas
Supreme Court addressed, the knock and talk procedure should take a new form in Arkansas.
The Arkansas Supreme Court should adopt the approaches Justices Brown and Hannah of-
fered. Id. at 801, 64 S.W.3d at 591 (Brown, J., concurring); Id. at 804, 64 S.W.3d at 592
(Hannah, J., concurring). Justices Brown and Hannah of the Arkansas Supreme Court agreed
that more could be done to protect the rights of criminal suspects and defendants. Id. at 801,
64 S.W.3d at 591 (Brown, J., concurring); Id. at 804, 64 S.W.3d at 593 (Hannah, J., concur-
ring). These two justices align their reasoning along with the second alternative to the
Bustamonte opinion, which includes requiring a written waiver in addition to the oral ac-
knowledgement. Id. at 801, 64 S.W.3d at 591 (Brown, J., concurring); Id. at 804, 64 S.W.3d
at 593 (Hannah, J., concurring) (citations omitted). As Justice Brown noted, requiring written
waivers are beneficial for two reasons. Id. at 803, 67 S.W.3d at 592 (Brown, J., concurring).
First, there is no question as to whether consent was given. Id., 67 S.W.3d at 592 (Brown, J.,
concurring). Second, there is no question as to whether the defendant was notified of his
right to refuse consent because the waiver would appear directly on the consent form. Id., 67
S.W.3d at 592 (Brown, J., concurring).
On the other hand, it may be argued that merely providing an acknowledgement,
oral or written, will not satisfy the concerns involving the voluntary consent factor. Suspects
may still be presented with coercive situations. Strauss, supra note 92, at 254-55. This issue
is illustrated by the fact that even when required to provide oral acknowledgements, officers
are able to continue to attempt to persuade the individual into consenting to the warrantless
search. Id. Thus, individuals may involuntarily consent to searches when they interpret the
officer's persistence as a rejection of their earlier disapproval. Id. at 255. Nonetheless, requir-
ing acknowledgement forms is a step in the right direction. Griffin, 347 Ark. at 803, 67
S.W.3d at 592 (Brown, J., concurring). While it may not alleviate all of the concerns sur-
rounding consent searches, it is still needed. Strauss, supra note 92, at 256.
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2. Parting from Pretext
A local police officer arrested Kenneth Andrew Sullivan at a local ser-
vice station in Conway, Arkansas. 88 During the search the officer found
narcotics and charged Kenneth Sullivan with possession of methampheta-
mines, narcotics paraphernalia, and intent to distribute methampheta-
mines.1 89 Sullivan sought suppression of the evidence based on a pretextual
arrest argument.1 90 He argued that the officer opted to arrest, rather than to
issue a citation for the traffic offenses, after the officer recognized his name
from previous narcotics investigations. 191 Thus, Sullivan theorized that the
officer arrested him in order to search his vehicle for drugs and that the ar-
rest was merely a "sham" used to carry out the officer's subjective mo-
tive. 
1 92
On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the Arkansas Su-
preme Court held that, as a matter of state constitutional law, the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Whren v. United States193 was no longer
controlling law regarding pretextual arrest.' 94 The court announced that arti-
cle 2, section 15 of the Arkansas Constitution affords more rights than its
Federal Constitution counterpart -the Fourth Amendment. 95 Specifically,
contrary to the Whren holding, pretextual arrests are invalid under the Ar-
kansas Constitution. 96 Thus, Sullivan v. State became another example of
the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision to enter the new judicial federalism.
In Sullivan III, the Arkansas Supreme Court noted that, although the
language of article 2, section 15 is "virtually identical" to the language of
the Fourth Amendment, state law demonstrates a different interpretation
under Arkansas law. 197 Despite the similarity in language, Arkansas has
"traditionally treated pretextual arrests differently than have the federal
courts.1 98 In support of its analysis the court traced over twenty years of
188. Sullivan 1, 340 Ark. 315, 316, 11 S.W.3d 526, 526 (2000). The officer stopped Sul-
livan for speeding and illegal window tint. Sullivan 111, 348 Ark. 647, 656, 74 S.W.3d 215,
221 (2002). After arresting Sullivan the officer performed an inventory search of Sullivan's
vehicle. Sullivan 1, 340 Ark. at 316, 11 S.W.3d at 526.
189. Sullivan 1, 340 Ark. at 316, 11 S.W.3d at 527.
190. Id. at 317, 11 S.W.3d at 527.
191. Id., 11 S.W.3d at 527.
192. Brief for Appellee at 1, Sullivan v. State, 348 Ark. 647, 74 S.W.3d 215 (2002) (No.
CR99-1140).
193. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
194. Sullivan 111, 348 Ark. at 649, 74 S.W.3d at 216 (2002).
195. Id. at 658, 74 S.W.3d at 222.
196. Id., 74 S.W.3d at 222.
197. Id. at 650-51, 74 S.W.3d at 217-18.
198. Id. at 652-55, 74 S.W.3d at 218 (citing Ray v. State, 304 Ark. 489, 803 S.W.2d 894
(1991); Hines v. State, 289 Ark. 50, 709 S.W.2d 65 (1986); Richardson v. State, 288 Ark.
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precedent related to pretextual arrests. 199 After a thorough analysis of that
precedent, the court concluded that although it has interpreted article 2, sec-
tion 15 of the Arkansas Constitution identical to the United States Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, in application, the court
has differed in its analysis as related to pretextual arrests.20 0 Thus, the court
established its rationale for explicitly rejecting the United States Supreme
Court's interpretation.20'
A challenge to an arrest as a pretext for some ulterior motive must now
meet the "but for" test.20 2 The court will consider whether the arrest would
have taken place but for a typically more serious crime.20 3 The court went
on to state, "[w]here the police have a dual motive in making an arrest, what
might be termed the covert motive is not tainted by the overt motive, even
though the covert motive may be dominant., 20 4 Therefore, the court's ques-
tion became "would the arresting officer have effected the full custodial
arrest but for his suspicion that Sullivan was involved in narcotics? '20 5 It
appears that to fully analyze a pretextual inquiry, the court will have to look
to the subjective intent of the arresting officer.206 The subjectivity of the but
for test is important because some scholars argue that a subjective test is the
only way a court can truly evaluate the existence of pretext.
407, 706 S.W.2d 363 (1986); Brewer v. State, 271 Ark. 810, 611 S.W.2d 179 (1981); Smith
v. State, 265 Ark. 104, 576 S.W.2d 957 (1979)).
199. Id., 74 S.W.3d at 218-21.
200. See Sullivan III, 348 Ark. at 652-55, 74 S.W.3d at 218-21.
201. Id., 74 S.W.3d at 218-21.
202. Id. at 654, 74 S.W.3d at 220.
203. Id. at 656-57, 74 S.W.3d at 220.
204. Id. at 654, 74 S.W.3d at 220 (citing Hines v. State, 289 Ark. 50, 709 S.W.2d 65
(1986) (holding that in a case where the defendant was suspected of murder but arrested on
other charges, no pretext existed where the defendant would have been arrested for the later
charge notwithstanding his suspected connection to the murder case); Ray v. State, 304 Ark.
489, 803 S.W.2d 894 (1991) (holding that although the police obtained statements from
defendant while in custody for non-related charges, there was no need for pretext analysis
when the defendant challenged the use of those statements in a later homicide conviction
because the defendant could not show that he would not have been arrested but for pretext
given the amount of evidence gathered against him in the homicide investigation)).
205. Id. at 656-57, 74 S.W.3d at 221.
206. See Erika Ross Montgomery, Note, Pretext in a State of Confusion-The Arkansas
Court Takes a Stand on Pretextual Arrests, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 511, 535
(2001).
207. Patricia Leary & Stephanie Rae Williams, Toward a State Constitutional Check on
Police Discretion to Patrol the Fourth Amendments Outer Frontier: A Subjective Test for
Pretextual Seizures, 69 Temp. L. Rev. 1007 (1996). The Arkansas Supreme Court should
consider explicitly adopting a subjective approach to the Sullivan "but for" test. First, if the
court's inquiry is whether the officer would have effected the arrest "but for" another unre-
lated suspicion, then the court must question the officer's subjective intent if it is to fully
analyze its own test. Second, as some scholars point out, the subjectivity of the officer's
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3. Picking Up Privacy
In Jegley v. Picado,2 °8 the Arkansas Supreme Court considered a chal-
lenge to the state's anti-sodomy statute. 209 The plaintiffs argued that the
statute violated their right to privacy under the Arkansas Constitution.21°
The court concluded that the Arkansas Constitution affords individuals a
greater right to privacy than is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.211 It
was not until over a year later that the United States Supreme Court reached
a similar conclusion, finding that the Federal Constitution's privacy right
extended to homosexual activity.21 2 The Arkansas Supreme Court's inter-
pretation illustrates the State's entry into the new judicial federalism.
213
In its departure the Picado court first examined the text of the Arkan-
sas Constitution,2 14 pointing out textual differences between the Federal and
motive is the crux of the pretext issue, and courts have lost sight of this fact. See supra text
accompanying note 207.
Further, the Arkansas Supreme Court should not be concerned about the pitfalls of
applying a subjective approach. Although some scholars note that subjective tests go against
the notion of objective law, other scholars note that pretextual conduct itself is unreasonable
and goes against the notion of fairness under the law. See supra text accompanying note 105.
Additionally, public policy concerns call for aggressive approaches to unconstitutional be-
havior. For example the Picado court used the emphasis on privacy in statutes as a basis for
arguing a strong public policy concern for recognizing a constitutional right to privacy under
Arkansas law. Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 628-29, 80 S.W.3d 332, 347-48. Pretextual
conduct is unconstitutional. Sullivan 111, 348 Ark. 647, 74 S.W.3d 215 (2002). It results in
unjustified government intrusions, sometimes on the basis of race. These concerns are a
matter of public policy. Thus, pretextual issues should be dealt with aggressively, even if it
means testing them subjectively. See supra text accompanying note 206.
208. Picado, 349 Ark. at 600, 80 S.W.3d at 332. The plaintiffs challenged the statute on
theories of equal protection and privacy. Id. at 610, 80 S.W.3d at 334. The author would like
to stress the importance of the Picado holding, however, the discussion of the case will be
limited to its analysis of an individual's right to privacy under the Arkansas Constitution
because a discussion of equal protection is beyond the scope of this article. See Bonnie John-
son, Note, Arkansas Joins Other States in a Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of
Individual Rights, Establishing New Protections for Arkansas Gays and Lesbians, 25 U.
ARK. LIrLE ROCKL. REv. 681 (2003).
209. Picado, 349 Ark. at 608, 80 S.W.3d at 334. The statute provided:
(a) A person commits sodomy if such person performs any act of sexual gratifi-
cation involving: (1) The penetration, however slight, of the anus or mouth of an
animal or a person by the penis of a person of the same sex or an animal; or (2)
The penetration, however slight, of the vagina or anus of an animal or a person
by any body member of a person of the same sex or an animal. (b) Sodomy is a
Class A misdemeanor.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-22 (Michie Repl. 1997).
210. Picado, 349 Ark. at 608, 80 S.W.3d at 334.
211. Seeid., 80 S.W.3d at 334.
212. See Lawrence v. Texas, No. 02-102, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 5013 (June 26, 2003).
213. See Picado, 349 Ark. at 600, 80 S.W.3d at 332.
214. Id., 80 S.W.3d at 345.
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Arkansas Constitutions. 215 For example, article 2, section 29 states that
rights enumerated in the Arkansas Constitution must not be construed to
deny rights retained by the people.216 The court found that other provisions
of the state constitution also recognize a right to privacy.217 Additionally,
the court cited several criminal procedure rules that afford privacy rights.218
The court also looked to other states with similar statutes.219 Specifically the
Kentucky Constitution contains provisions similar to the Arkansas Constitu-
tion,22 0 and Kentucky has invalidated its sodomy statute.22' The court con-
cluded, "[I]n considering our constitution together with the statutes, rules,
and case law mentioned above, it is clear to this court that Arkansas has a
rich and compelling tradition of protecting individual privacy., 222 Thus, the
Picado decision became another example of Arkansas's entry into judicial
federalism.
III. WELCOME TO THE FUTURE, Now WHAT DID IT ALL MEAN?-A
PROPOSAL OF GUIDELINES TO FOLLOW IN FUTURE APPLICATIONS OF
JUDICIAL FEDERALISM IN ARKANSAS
A practical result of the new judicial federalism is that state courts
learned how to approach and interpret their own constitutions. 2" This learn-
ing process involved watching how other courts, state and federal, accom-
plished this task.224 Litigants also took responsibility for seeing to it that
new claims and arguments, pioneered in other courts, were brought and
heard before their state supreme court.225
The Arkansas Supreme Court seems confident in its decision to grant
more rights under the Arkansas Constitution than are allowed under the
Federal Constitution. 226 The court announced that while it previously inter-
215. Id. at 627, 80 S.W.3d at 346.
216. Id., 80 S.W.3d at 346-47.
217. Id. at 627-30, 80 S.W.3d at 347-49 (citing ARK. CONST. art. II, §§ 2, 8, 21).
218. Id. at 629, 80 S.W.3d at 348-49 (citing ARK. R. CRIM. P. 2.2, 8.1, 10.1).
219. Picado, 349 Ark. at 625-27, 80 S.W.3d at 345-46.
220. Id. at 626-27, 80 S.W.3d at 346. The court noted that the two constitutions had
similar textual language regarding the right to privacy. Id. at 626, 80 S.W.3d at 346.
221. Id., 80 S.W.3d at 346. Similar to the Arkansas Constitution, the Kentucky Constitu-
tion bestows certain inalienable rights, including right to privacy. Id., 80 S.W.3d at 348.
222. Id. at 631-32, 80 S.W.3d at 349-50.
223. Tarr, New Judicial Federalism, supra note 10, at 1110.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1113. Litigants, however, will only raise state constitutional arguments if they
believe they will be well-received. Id.
226. The court cites Griffin v. State, 347 Ark. 788, 67 S.W.3d 582 (2002), in its discus-
sion of independent analysis under the Arkansas Constitution. An Arkansas Supreme Court
justice has even noted when litigants fail to rely on the Arkansas Constitution and implied
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preted the Arkansas Constitution lockstep with the United States Supreme
Court, it will no longer do so. 227 The Arkansas Supreme Court, however,
will not consider state law arguments unless the litigants first offer them.228
Thus, it is important for litigants to offer state constitutional law arguments.
Also, in light of the Arkansas Supreme Court's recent activism, practitio-
ners have a responsibility to look to other sources of state law and rely on
them when appropriate.
The litigants are not the only parties with the responsibility of ensuring
that the state constitutional reliance is evident. The Arkansas Supreme Court
has a part to play as well. In light of the Long decision, the court must make
it unequivocally clear that it is relying on state, rather than federal law. 29
Even if the Arkansas Supreme Court wanted to utilize its own constitution,
that effort could be trumped by the United States Supreme Court finding
that the court did not adequately express its intent in the opinion.230 Thus,
emphasis is placed on the clear and plain statement of self-reliance.
The Arkansas Supreme Court may also consider adopting a methodol-
ogy for analyzing state constitutional claims. Additionally, litigants may
consider proposing specific methodologies and requesting that the court
consider adopting them. In Griffin, the court looked to the Arkansas Rules
of Criminal Procedure for guidance.23" ' The court noted that under the pro-
cedural rules nighttime searches have been treated differently than they
have under federal law.232 In Sullivan' the court pointed to analytical differ-
ences in state precedent.233 Further, in Picado, the court analyzed textual
differences, state statutes, and case law in determining that the Arkansas
Constitution protects privacy interests.23 4 Thus, it would seem as though the
Arkansas Supreme Court implicitly utilized the primacy model identified by
Ronald F. Utter, or alternatively Ronald Collins's non-equivocal analysis
that the litigant might have found more favorable law under the Arkansas Constitution. See
Keenom v. State, 349 Ark. 381, 80 S.W.3d 743 (2002) (Brown, J., dissenting).
227. Sullivan 1, 340 Ark. 315, 11 S.W.3d 526 (2000).
228. Tarr, New Judicial Federalism, supra note 10, at 1113. "[M]ost courts refuse to
decide cases on the basis of legal arguments not briefed by the parties; indeed most state
supreme courts do not allow counsel to raise state constitutional issues if they were not ar-
gued in the lower court." Id. Thus, "state constitutional arguments are a prerequisite for
decisions based on state declarations of rights." Id.
229. The importance of this requirement is discussed in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032
(1983). See supra Part II.B.4.
230. The United States Supreme Court was not persuaded that the Michigan State Su-
preme Court's holding was based on adequate and independent state grounds. Long, 463 U.S.
at 1043. The Court pointed out that the state court only referenced its constitution twice, and
relied on federal precedent throughout the remainder of the opinion. Id. at 1037.
231. See supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 214-22 and accompanying text.
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approach. 235 Although the court did not expressly apply either of these ter-
minologies, the approach is the same.
When breaking new ground or deciding different issues in the future,
the Arkansas Supreme Court may consider developing a specific set of fac-
tors for identifying appropriate application of the state constitution.236 In
Sullivan, the court cited the Gunwall opinion,237 and it would be beneficial
to the court and litigants if the Arkansas Supreme Court developed a set of
Gunwall-like factors. This development would be beneficial for several
reasons. First, the traditionally viewed approach, articulated in the Sullivan
and Picado opinions, would be helpful in assisting litigants and the court in
areas of law where there exists a traditional view that differs from the fed-
eral view. 238 This theory, however, may not always apply.239 Additionally,
outlining a specific set of factors will assist litigants in their briefing and
presentation of arguments to the court.240 Lastly, it appears that the court is
already on the verge of consistently looking to specific factors, so perhaps
the court should explicitly enumerate these factors. 241 The following sub-
section outlines four potential state reliance factors developed by examining
the Arkansas Supreme Court's analysis in the Griffin, Sullivan, and Picado
decisions.
A. Text
Examining the text of the Arkansas Constitution appears to be one of
the most important starting points for analyzing state constitutional depar-
tures. In the Griffin, Sullivan, and Picado decisions, the Arkansas Supreme
Court began its analysis by examining the relevant constitutional provi-
235. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
236. In Gunwall, the Washington Supreme Court listed six factors for determining
whether an issue should be analyzed on state constitutional grounds. See State v. Gunwall,
720 P.2d 808, 811 (Wash. 1986); Williams, supra note 94, at 12; see supra Part II.B.4 (list-
ing the six factors used by the court).
237. Sullivan Ill, 348 Ark. 647, 652, 74 S.W.3d 215, 218 (2002).
238. Consider the Arkansas Supreme Court's recent holding in Jegley v. Picado, 349
Ark. 600, 80 S.W.3d 332 (2002), where there is not a traditional view against homosexual
sodomy.
239. Sullivan Ii, 348 Ark. at 658, 74 S.W.3d at 222 (Glaze, J., dissenting). In his dissent-
ing opinion, Justice Glaze criticizes the court's reliance on the cited precedent as the ration-
ale for departing from the United States Supreme Court's interpretation. Id., 74 S.W.3d at
222 (Glaze, J., dissenting). Justice Glaze opined that the cite precedent analyzed pretext
under the Fourth Amendment, and therefore did not support the court's departure from fed-
eral interpretation. Id., 74 S.W.3d at 223 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
240. See generally discussion supra Part III.
241. In both the Griffin and Picado decisions, the court relied on statutes and the Arkan-
sas Rules of Criminal Procedure. See supra notes 161-65, 218, 222 and accompanying text.
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242sion. In some instances the court concluded that the constitutional provi-
sion is similar to its federal counterpart.243 In other instances the court con-
cluded that the provisions are dissimilar.244 The Picado court noted that
there were both textual and structural differences between the Federal and
Arkansas Constitutions.245 Additionally, the court went to great lengths to
analyze several sections of the Arkansas Constitution.246
B. Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, and Procedural Rules
Similarly, a second factor the court may consider is the particular lan-
guage of other Arkansas constitutional provisions. Although the Picado
court found that the Arkansas Constitution does not explicitly confer the
right to privacy, the court did find other provisions of the Arkansas Consti-
tution that specifically mention the right to privacy. 247 Moreover, the court
expressly stated that in the absence of explicit language, it will look to other
constitutional provisions to gain a better understanding of the issue.248
In addition to other constitutional provisions, the court continued its
analysis by stating that it must also consider statutes. The court discovered
that over eighty-one Arkansas statutes contain references to a right of pri-
vacy.249
The court may also look to procedural rules, such as the Arkansas
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 250 The court in Picado explicitly stated that it
must consider local rules in its analysis of the right to privacy. 251 Likewise,
the Griffin court relied on the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure in its
analysis of the nighttime knock and talk procedure.
252
C. Horizontal Federalism
A third consideration available to the Arkansas Supreme Court is to
rely on other courts' experimentations with various methodologies when
242. See, e.g., Griffin v. State, 347 Ark. 788, 793, 67 S.W.3d 582, 585 (2002).
243. Id., 67 S.W.3d at 585.
244. Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 624, 80 S.W.3d 332, 345 (2002).
245. Id., 80 S.W.3d at 345.
246. Id., 80 S.W.3d at 345.
247. Id. at 627 n.5, 80 S.W.3d at 347 (stating that Arkansas Constitutional Amendment
51, section 6 specifically sets forth a right to privacy as it relates to voter registration).
248. Id. at 628, 80 S.W.3d at 348.
249. Id. at 628-29 n.6, 80 S.W.3d at 348. The Court noted that the General Assembly's
emphasis on the right to privacy indicated a public policy of protecting privacy rights. Id. at
628-29, 80 S.W.3d at 347-48.
250. See supra notes 162-65.
251. Picado, 349 Ark. at 628, 80 S.W.3d at 347. The court considered the Arkansas
Rules of Criminal Procedure in its analysis. See supra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
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interpreting future state constitutional provisions. In fact, in practice the
court is already participating in horizontal federalism. In a 1994 opinion, the
Arkansas Supreme Court looked to the Minnesota Supreme Court when it
determined that, for all purposes, a jury must be comprised of twelve indi-
viduals.253 In the Griffin opinion, the court adopted the Ninth Circuit's defi-
nition of "knock and talk., 254 The court went further and determined that the
officer's conduct did not comport with the Davis holding, and therefore,
was not a valid knock and talk.255 In Picado the court analyzed other juris-
dictions' decisions regarding privacy and homosexual activity. 6 In deter-
mining whether the Arkansas Constitution affords more privacy rights, the
court noted that Georgia, Montana, and Tennessee have all interpreted their
state constitutions as affording a right to privacy.257 Finally, the court noted
that the Kentucky Constitution is similar in wording to the Arkansas Consti-
tution and stated that Kentucky no longer applied its same sex sodomy stat-
ute.258 In Sullivan, the Court cited, with approval, Washington case law.
25 9
Thus, the third factor in the Arkansas Supreme Court's state law reliance
factors could be dedicated to the notion of horizontal federalism.
D. Traditionally Viewed
In both Sullivan and Picado, the Arkansas Supreme Court summarized
its analysis by concluding that Arkansas traditionally views an issue one
way or the other.2 60 Thus, the court may consider adopting a traditionally
viewed factor. As in the Picado analysis, the court may analyze all relevant
laws, including local rules and case law, to determine whether Arkansas has
traditionally viewed the disputed issue differently under Arkansas law. An
affirmative answer gives the court grounds for departing from federal
precedent.
253. See Byrd v. State, 317 Ark. 609, 613-14, 879 S.W.2d 435, 437 (1994).
254. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 221.
257. Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 625-26, 80 S.W.3d 332, 345-46. Additionally, the
court observed that nine other states have invalidated sodomy statutes by judicial decisions
and twenty-six have invalidated them by legislative action. Id. at 625 n.4, 80 S.W.3d at 346.
Only six states have statutes prohibiting same sex sodomy. Id., 80 S.W.3d at 346.
258. See supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
259. Sullivan III, 348 Ark. 647, 652, 74 S.W.2d 215, 218 (2002).
260. In Sullivan III, the court held that Arkansas has traditionally viewed the issue of
pretext differently than the United States Supreme Court, notwithstanding the textual simi-
larities of the two constitutions. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. In Picado, the
court concludes that Arkansas has a tradition of acknowledging a right to privacy. See supra
note 217 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 25
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
On the other hand, a traditionally viewed element may serve as a limi-
tation in the application of the Arkansas Constitution. In Sullivan and
Picado, although the court found that the issues were traditionally viewed
differently under state law, arguments were presented that they were not.
261
Thus, the court may consider adopting the local concern element from the
Gunwall factors.262 Under that analysis the court may determine that an is-
sue is of local concern and deserves attention under the Arkansas Constitu-
tion without first establishing a long tradition of such treatment. Thus, al-
though the court seemed to articulate a "traditionally viewed approach, 263
nothing would prevent the court from looking to other factors for considera-
tion, such as its sister states, language of the constitutional provision, local
and statutory rules, and general state policy.
IV. CONCLUSION
Justice William J. Brennan would be proud of the Justices of the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court and their opinions in Griffin, Sullivan, and Picado.
The revitalization of state constitutional law demonstrates the magnificent
potential underlying state constitutional jurisprudence. The Arkansas Su-
preme Court's decision to enter the judicial federalism movement will im-
pact the state greatly. First, the emphasis on state constitutional law will
bring about an increased awareness of our state constitution. This increased
awareness will assist litigants in advocating state constitutional law claims.
The revitalization of the Arkansas Constitution has also extended individual
rights for criminal defendants, and the possibility of increased civil liberties
beyond those recognized in Griffin, Sullivan, and Picado is not unrealistic.
Finally, the revitalization of the state constitution accentuates the state's
identity and symbolizes a willingness to adopt rules that govern the state
based on the needs of the state and not the federal government.
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261. Picado, 349 Ark. at 610, 80 S.W.3d at 335.
262. See generally discussion supra Part II.B.4.
263. See Picado, 349 Ark. at 631-32, 80 S.W.3d at 349-50; Sullivan 111, 348 Ark. at
652-55, 74 S.W.3d at 218-21.
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